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I
This paper will illustrate how US constitutional law on the “Establishment 
Clause” of the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States2 is impro-
perly influencing the religious culture and practices of Argentina. It will do so 
through the example of a dramatic real life situation which led to a momentous 
judicial decision. While drawing some conclusions from the affair, the paper will 
briefly consider the relevance of comparative constitutional analysis in the area of 
law and religion. It will also offer some observations on the comparative enterprise 
in general in order to attempt to explain how a problematic example, such as the 
Argentine case of the Virgin Mary in the Palace of Justice, can illuminate the proper 
understanding of comparative constitutional law.
Practical situations are often solved by lawyers and judges through impracti-
cal means. In such instances, disasters usually follow, or at least regrettable conse-
quences. Comparative constitutional law is sometimes used in such way. The case 
of the image of the Virgin Mary in the main hall of the main Argentine courthouse 
iridescently illustrates the disaster –or at least the regrettable consequences.
Late in 2001, Argentina was undergoing a tremendous economic crisis.3 In 
1  Profesor Titular de Derecho Constitucional, Universidad Católica Argentina; investigador del 
CONICET. Este trabajo se presentó originalmente en el Congreso The Competing Claims of Law and Reli-
gion (Pepperdine University School of Law, febrero 2012) y se encuentra en prensa en Estados Unidos en el 
Journal of Law, Philosophy and Culture, Vol VII, 2013.
2  U.s. coNst. amend. I: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or pro-
hibiting the free exercise thereof […]”.
3  See Horacio Spector, Don’t Cry for Me Argentina: Economic Crises and the Restructuring of Finan-
cial Property, XIV forDham JoUrNal of corporate & fiNaNcial law 771, 777–779 (2009). A similar crisis 
had already taken place in 1989. See Manuel Jose Garcia-Mansilla, Separation of Powers Crisis: the Case 
of Argentina, 32 ga. J. iNt’l & comp. l. 307, 353–357 (2004). Indeed, García-Mansilla is right: “Economic 
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order to cope with it the government froze most bank accounts. People went mad: 
some went wild while others were simply depressed. Some sued the banks and the 
government. They were sometimes sent by their lawyers to lobby judges by means 
of threatening that they would commit suicide if they did not get their money back 
instantly; others threatened the lives of the very judges who had to decide the cases; 
people from all walks gathered in front of the main courthouse and even within the 
main hall of that house: the crippled, the elderly, mothers with babies, persons who 
had not slept a wink for days, people under heavy medication4. They all gathered in 
a form of protest. Of course, all this was immediately catalyzed by the multiplying 
effect of television and the internet. 
A group of protesters decided to place an image of the Virgin Mary in the main 
hall of the so called “Palace of Justice”, home to the Supreme Court and to the most 
important federal courts. The Supreme Court itself acquiesced to the placement of 
the image. Hundreds gathered there every single day to pray that their deposits 
would be released. This offered some relief to many.
II
The Palace of Justice had become too a Temple of Justice. But some did not 
like this. They felt that their own constitutional rights wer e being affected by this 
transformation of the building. “Asociación por los Derechos Civiles” (“ADC”), a 
human rights NGO significantly funded by American companies5, filed suit against 
the Supreme Court requesting the removal of the image of the Virgin Mary from 
the Palace of Justice6. The ADC claim was premised in part on a purported analogy 
between the Constitution of Argentina and the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment to the U.S. constitution; and on American constitutional case law on 
religious freedom7.
ADC did not object the constitutional right to religious freedom of the praying 
petitioners but contended that it was limited by the rights of others. According to 
ADC, the Supreme Court’s authorization of the presence of the image of the Vir-
emergencies are familiar in Argentina, as are restrictions on the economic rights of citizens during crisis.” 
Id. at 354. 
4  This context was accurately described to me ten years after the events took place by one of the law 
clerks for the Federal Court of Appeals that in the end solved the case of the image of the Virgin Mary. Email 
of Juan José Galeano, 28 December 2011, on file with the author.
5  See Asociación por los Derechos Civiles, la corte y los Derechos 2005/2007 24 (Siglo veintiuno 
editores 2008) (statement by Roberto Saba and Álvaro Herrero in the “Foreward” to this official publication, 
acknowledging sustained contribution of the Ford Foundation). More information about ADC at http://www.
adc.org.ar/sw_contenido.php?id=383, last visited 5 January 2012.
6  The suit was joined by two lawyers, Natalia Monti and Sebastián Schvartzman, invoking their own 
individual rights. Monti and Schvartzman were simultaneously on the legal staff of ADC. See http://www.
adc.org.ar/sw_contenido.php?id=383, last visited 5 January 2012.
7  Hernán Gullco, main counsel of ADC (and the attorney in charge of the law suit), kindly provided 
me with a copy of the claim. Email of Hernán Gullco, 27 December 2011, on file with the author. In Argentina 
there is a limited public access to legal documents produced by the parties.
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gin Mary and of collective recitation of prayers within the Palace of Justice would 
jeopardize the right of everyone to be treated equally under the law. Non-religious 
people could reasonably have the impression that Catholics might be favored by the 
courts.8 ADC distinguished the situation of the image of the Virgin Mary from the 
one in the American case Lynch v. Donnelly,9 where the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that the public exhibition of a Christmas crèche by a municipality did not violate 
the First Amendment, given that it had a “secular purpose”10 independent of its 
religious origin.11 This kind of purpose was clearly absent, according to ADC, in the 
placement of the image in the Palace of Justice.
The district court agreed with ADC and ordered the removal of the image. 
Several persons (invoking their affiliation to the Catholic religion) and “Corporación 
de Abogados Católicos” (an NGO that promotes Catholic values in the legal profes-
sion) appealed. When the Court of Appeals was considering the case, the image was 
removed as a consequence of an executive order of the Supreme Court intending to 
comply with the district court’s judgment. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals deter-
mined the case had not become moot and rendered a decision on the merits.12 One 
judge dissented, determining that the Supreme Court’s acquiescence of the district 
court’s ruling rendered unnecessary a judgment on the merits.13
The Court of Appeals disagreed with ADC’s reasoning, which had been endor-
sed by the district court. A key tenet of the higher court’s holding was that the 
Argentine system of religious freedom is different from “other systems such as, for 
example, that of the U.S.”.14 Therefore, the Court of Appeals held mistaken “the 
plaintiffs’ invocation of foreign caselaw, rendered in the context of legal systems 
different from ours and hence inapplicable to this claim”.15 The Court proceeded to 
explain what I have termed “the Argentine system of religious freedom” and argued 
that it is distinct or even unique. It awarded special relevance to article 2 of the 
Constitution stating that “[t]he Federal Government supports the Roman Catholic 
Apostolic Faith”.16
Even though the Court of Appeals consequently overruled the district court’s 
decision, the image of the Virgin Mary did not return to the Palace of Justice. ADC’s 
claim and reasoning had been rejected but the Supreme Court did not issue a new 
authorization for the placement of the image. Nevertheless, and given the rejection 
8  Law suit, at section 3.1, on file with author.
9  Lynch v. Donnelly 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
10  Id., at 679–680.
11  In section 3.2, the claim invokes another U.S. Supreme Court decision, affording it apparent prec-
edential value: West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). For the reasons 
offered in section III of this note this a serious mistake.
12  Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Contencioso Administrativo Federal, Sala IV [Cámara] 
[Federal Court of Appeals], 20/04/2004, “Asociación por los Derechos Civiles (ADC) y otros c/ EN (PJN)”, 
Fallos de la Cámara [Fallos] (2004) (Arg.), at section 6.2 (available at http://www.pjn.gov.ar/Publicacio-
nes/00001/00015218.Pdf, last visited 11 January 2012).
13  Id., dissent of Judge Uslenghi, at section 5.
14  Id., vote of Judge Jeanneret de Pérez Cortés, who was joined by Judge Galli, at section 8.2.
15  Id., vote of Judge Jeanneret de Pérez Cortés, who was joined by Judge Galli, at section 9.1.
16  arg. coNst. art. 2.
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of its claim, ADC appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ deci-
sion in a 5–4 judgment without giving an opinion on the merits. Rather, in vaca-
ting the Court of Appeals’ decision the majority of the Supreme Court held that a 
decision on the merits was unnecessary given that the image of the Virgin Mary 
was no longer in place at the time the Court of Appeals had decided the case. Four 
Justices dissented, reasoning that while a Supreme Court’s decision on the merits 
had become unnecessary there was no need to overrule the Court of Appeals. Both 
the majority and the dissent agreed in that they would not pronounce a view of their 
own about the Court of Appeals reasoning, which remained uncontradicted.
III
While there is some value in a comparative approach to legal matters, not least 
in the area of constitutional law,17 it is one thing to recur to foreign materials as 
sources of illumination when interpreting one’s own law but it is a different thing to 
substitute one’s law for someone else’s law affording the latter an authority it does 
not have in one’s own legal system. This is what ADC would have had the Argentine 
judiciary do in the case of the image of the Virgin Mary –but an instance of a repea-
ted technique of substitution under the guise of borrowing: substitution of what one 
does not like of a given legal system for what one prefers of another one.
The Court of Appeals was right in acknowledging that even though the Argen-
tine Constitution was modeled after the U.S. Constitution, Argentine constitutional 
principle regarding law and religion differs significantly from its American counter-
part. Argentina has its own religious culture and practices which have been interwo-
ven into Argentine law and the Argentine Constitution. The same could be said of 
many other countries and this should serve as a warning before deciding whether to 
borrow from foreign law in this area.18
The case of the Virgin Mary is particularly enlightening. The kind of reasoning 
offered by ADC illustrates a mistake that ought to be avoided –a mistake swallowed 
writ large by the district court but well-spotted by the Court of Appeals. ADC’s rea-
soning has the following steps: i) The US Supreme Court decided in Lynch v. Donne-
lly19 that the public exhibition of a Christmas crèche by a municipality did not vio-
late the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, given that it had a “secular 
17  The literature on the problem of the use of comparative constitutional law is ever growing and it 
now includes the famous debate between Justices Scalia and Breyer, which took place in Washington DC 
in January of 2005. I consider Waldron’s the best attempt to tackle the problem, even if his analogy with 
experimental science is in the end faulty, on my view. See Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern 
Ius Gentium, 119 harv. l. rev. 129, 143–144 (2005); Legarre, S. y Orrego, C. (2010). “Los Usos del Derecho 
Constitucional Comparado y la Universalidad de los Derechos Humanos”. En 88 reDc (revista española 
De Derecho coNstitUcioNal) 11, 22. 
18  See Ran Hirschl, Comparative Constitutional Law and Religion, in comparative coNstitUtioNal 
law, 422 (Tom Ginsburg. & Rosalind Dixon eds. Edwar Elgar, Cheltenham 2008) (arguing that there is more 
cross-country divergence in the comparative constitutional jurisprudence of religious freedom than with 
respect to most other freedoms).
19  465 U.S. 668 (1984).
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purpose” independent of its religious origin; ii) The image of the Virgin Mary in the 
Argentine Palace of Justice does not have such secular purpose; iii) The exhibition of 
the latter image is in violation not only of the First Amendment of the U.S. constitu-
tion but also of article 2 of the Argentine Constitution.
Step (iii) of the above reasoning clearly is a non-sequitur. From the fact that 
the exhibition of the image of the Virgin Mary would be in violation of the First 
Amendment it does not follow that the display of the image would also be in vio-
lation of the Argentine constitution. This should be quite obvious. U.S. caselaw is 
not the law of the land in Argentina even when the Argentine Supreme Court often 
invokes decisions of its US counterpart.20 A precedent of the U.S. Supreme Court, 
such as Lynch, ought not to be treated as in need of distinguishing as if it were 
otherwise binding for the Argentine Supreme Court. 
Furthermore, the invocation of U.S. precedents by the Argentine Supreme 
Court is normally circumscribed to areas of the law where the text and the history 
of the constitution permit it.21 This is not the case with the area of religious freedom. 
Although the Argentine constitution recognizes a right to freedom of religion,22 a 
unique provision in article 2 of the constitution states that “[t]he Federal Govern-
ment supports the Roman Catholic Apostolic Faith”. This is in stark contrast with 
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. constitution declaring 
that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion”. The diffe-
rence is so evident that no more need be said on this score.
The case of the image of the Virgin Mary shows what happens when the con-
text is overlooked and set aside out of preference for grand principles. The district 
court made a great deal of the simple placement of a religious object of devotion in 
the hall of a court of justice at a particular time when people especially needed it 
there. Instead of considering the transient, critical situation the court opted for loo-
king toward a foreign jurisprudence that was out of place. Practical situations are 
often solved by lawyers and judges through impractical means…
20  See Jonathan M. Miller, The Authority of a Foreign Talisman: a Study of U.S. Constitutional Prac-
tice as Authority in Nineteenth Century Argentina and the Argentine Elite’s Leap of Faith 46 am. U.l. rev. 
1483, 1544–1553 (2005) (providing examples of the Argentine Supreme Court’s borrowing of U.S. precedents).
21  Rivera, J. C. Jr. (2011). “El uso del derecho comparado por parte de la Corte Suprema y la importa-
ción de la doctrina de la real malicia”. En Jurisprudencia Argentina, 2011-IV, 3, 8. 
22  arg. coNst. art. 14 “All inhabitants of the Nation enjoy the following rights, in accordance with the 
laws that regulate their exercise, namely: […] of freely practicing their religion.”
